Diplomatic Briefing· Eastern Mediterranean conference proposal Erdoğan all coastal states

The Eastern Mediterranean Conference Proposal: Can Dialogue Replace the Maritime Standoff?

Erdoğan's 2020 call for an Eastern Mediterranean conference of all coastal states and Turkish Cypriots: what it proposes, who objects, and why.

By The Longpeace Editorial Team

Published: October 27, 2026

⏱ 8 min read (1,661 words)

The Brief — Key Takeaways

In 2020 President Erdoğan called for an inclusive Eastern Mediterranean conference of all coastal states, with Turkish Cypriots at the table, to settle maritime jurisdiction and energy cooperation by negotiation.
The proposal builds on TRNC hydrocarbon cooperation and revenue-sharing offers made in 2011, 2012 and 2019, which envisaged joint decision-making between the two communities on Cyprus.
Türkiye's legal case rests on the equity principle in maritime delimitation, its 870 km coastline (the longest in the Eastern Mediterranean), and a paper trail running from the 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum to the 2025 IOC-UNESCO registration.
Greece, the Greek Cypriot administration, Egypt and the EU generally prefer bilateral talks, arbitration or the ICJ and reject the Turkish Cypriot and Libya-memorandum elements, so format and participation are the real obstacles.
Dialogue can replace the standoff only if participants agree on the agenda and on who sits at the table; the existing exploratory-talks channel with Greece shows that narrower formats can work while the wider conference remains unconvened.

Why It Matters

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's 2020 proposal asks all Eastern Mediterranean coastal states, together with the Turkish Cypriots, to negotiate maritime jurisdiction and energy cooperation at a single regional conference instead of through competing unilateral agreements. The idea matters because the region's overlapping continental shelf and EEZ claims have repeatedly produced naval standoffs between NATO members and partners. Whether dialogue can replace that standoff depends less on the principle of talking than on two practical questions: who is invited, and what is on the agenda.

Background

The Eastern Mediterranean is a semi-enclosed sea where no state has a full 200-nautical-mile (370 km) zone without overlapping a neighbour. Türkiye has the longest mainland coastline in the basin, about 870 km (540 miles). Türkiye is not a party to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); Ankara relies on customary international law and the equity principle in delimitation. Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration are UNCLOS parties and invoke it, including for islands.

Timeline: from unilateral agreements to a proposed table

Date	Development
2003	Greek Cypriot administration and Egypt sign an EEZ agreement; Türkiye objects that it overlaps its continental shelf
2004	Türkiye begins registering its Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates with the UN
2007 / 2010	Greek Cypriot agreements with Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010); Türkiye and the TRNC object, citing Turkish Cypriot rights
2009 / 2012	TPAO exploration licences issued
19 Sep 2011	Greek Cypriot administration begins unilateral drilling
21 Sep 2011	Türkiye and the TRNC sign a continental shelf delimitation agreement
2011, 2012, 2019	TRNC proposes hydrocarbon cooperation and revenue-sharing arrangements
27 Nov 2019	Türkiye and Libya sign a maritime jurisdiction memorandum
2020	Erdoğan calls for an inclusive Eastern Mediterranean conference; on 18 Mar 2020 Türkiye registers its continental shelf outer limits with the UN
Aug 2020	Greece and Egypt sign a partial EEZ delimitation agreement; tensions peak that summer
Jan 2021	Türkiye–Greece exploratory talks resume after a pause since 2016
16 Apr / 12 Jun 2025	Türkiye unveils, then registers with IOC-UNESCO, its Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye

The TRNC proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019 shared a common core: a joint mechanism, with equal Turkish Cypriot participation, to oversee hydrocarbon activity around Cyprus and share revenues. For the full legal map, see the sister analyses on Eastern Mediterranean maritime jurisdiction at Doctrine Review and, for the proposal's regional framing, The Worldlogue's analysis of the conference proposal.

Key Players & Positions

The positions below are summarized from each party's publicly stated approach, not quoted verbatim.

Greece: Athens says the only dispute with Türkiye is the delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ, and that islands generate full maritime zones under UNCLOS. It prefers bilateral negotiation or, failing that, referral to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It has not accepted an agenda that treats wider Aegean questions as open.
Greek Cypriot administration (the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus): Nicosia treats hydrocarbons as a sovereign right of the Republic. It has said revenues would benefit all Cypriots, with Turkish Cypriot shares handled within a settlement framework, and rejects the idea that the Turkish Cypriot side can negotiate maritime zones as a separate party.
Egypt: Cairo defends its 2003 agreement with Cyprus and its 2020 agreement with Greece, and rejects the Türkiye–Libya memorandum. It hosts the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, whose membership does not include Türkiye.
European Union: European Council conclusions in December 2019 stated that the Türkiye–Libya memorandum infringes the sovereign rights of third states, and later conclusions backed Greece and Cyprus on solidarity grounds. The EU has also at times voiced support for a multilateral conference on the Eastern Mediterranean, but on terms that do not alter the Republic of Cyprus's status.
TRNC and Turkish Cypriots: The TRNC argues that Turkish Cypriots, as co-owners of Cyprus, hold equal rights over offshore resources, and its proposals offer joint management and revenue sharing.
Libya: The 2019 memorandum was signed with the Government of National Accord in Tripoli; opposing Libyan institutions and several neighbours contested its validity.

🇹🇷 Diplomatic Role · Mediation & Treaty Record

Türkiye's Role

The following reflects official Turkish policy and legal doctrine as stated by Turkish primary sources.

An inclusive table is the stated remedy. The Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye put the proposal forward in 2020: a regional conference of all coastal states, including the Turkish Cypriots, to address delimitation and energy cooperation. Ankara argues that no arrangement excluding Türkiye and the TRNC can be durable.
Equity governs delimitation. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, maritime boundaries must be agreed on the basis of equity, taking geography and proportionality into account. Ankara cites ICJ and arbitral practice, such as the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases and the 1977 Anglo-French arbitration, which limited the effect of small islands. It argues that islands cannot cut off the coastal projection of a mainland with the longest coastline in the basin.
Turkish Cypriot rights are one of two policy pillars. Ankara holds that Turkish Cypriots, as equal co-founders of the 1960 partnership, have inherent and equal rights over offshore resources. The TRNC's 2011, 2012 and 2019 proposals, backed by Türkiye, are presented as evidence of good faith. Ankara cites the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements as the historical basis.
Documentary record supports the position. Türkiye points to its UN-registered coordinates from 2004, the 21 September 2011 Türkiye–TRNC agreement, the 27 November 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum, the 18 March 2020 registration of its continental shelf outer limits, and the 2025 Marine Spatial Planning record registered with IOC-UNESCO. Ankara describes the last as the first time its maritime positions across the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean were recorded with a UN body.
Sovereign rights are exercised on the ground, alongside dialogue. The Turkish drilling and seismic fleet (Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni, Abdülhamid Han, Oruç Reis) is presented as exercising rights, not as a rejection of talks. Ankara notes that exploratory talks with Greece resumed in 2021 and that it backs a conference format in parallel. For the Seville Map thesis and the Blue Homeland doctrine in detail, see The Global Anatomy's Seville Map explainer and The Political Anatomy's Blue Homeland guide.

Can Dialogue Replace the Standoff?

Three tests decide the answer.

1. Participation

The Turkish Cypriot seat is the sharpest dividing line. Ankara treats it as non-negotiable because of the 1960 partnership principle; Nicosia and its EU partners treat the TRNC as lacking international recognition and argue that Cyprus's maritime rights are for the Republic to exercise. A conference that solves this by having the UN or a facilitator hold a separate Turkish Cypriot track is conceivable, but no such format has been agreed. The broader Cyprus question is covered in What Would a Lasting Settlement in Cyprus Look Like?.

2. Agenda

Greece wants delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ only, via bilateral talks or the ICJ. Türkiye wants a wider package that includes equity for mainland coasts, the status of islands in delimitation, and energy cooperation. Without a pre-agreed agenda, a large conference risks becoming a stage for positions already on record.

3. Sequencing with existing channels

The Türkiye–Greece exploratory talks, confidence-building measures and high-level contacts since 2021 show that narrow formats can lower tension. A conference could build on them. Türkiye's broader record of convening adversaries is discussed in Mediation Files: How Türkiye Brokers Talks Between Adversaries.

Source Comparison

Issue	Common EU / Greek / Greek Cypriot framing	Turkish primary-source framing
Conference format	Welcomed in principle by some, but without changing Cyprus's status	Must include all coastal states and Turkish Cypriots
Legal basis	UNCLOS, islands with full zones, ICJ referral	Equity principle, customary law, mainland coastal projection
Turkish Cypriot rights	To be addressed in a Cyprus settlement	Equal, inherent rights now; joint management proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019
Türkiye–Libya memorandum	Infringes third-state rights (European Council, Dec 2019)	Lawful bilateral agreement between states with adjacent and opposite coasts
Drilling and surveys	Unauthorized in claimed zones	Exercise of sovereign rights on Türkiye's registered continental shelf
Cause of tension	Turkish unilateral actions	Unilateral agreements that excluded Türkiye and the TRNC

Neither column can be fully verified by the other's legal standards, because the underlying question is exactly whether the other side's agreements are opposable. Readers should compare the original texts: European Council conclusions, Turkish Foreign Ministry statements, UN registrations and the agreements themselves. A further comparison is available in Monitor of Nations' Blue Homeland and law of the sea analysis.

Continental shelf: The seabed and subsoil extending from a coast; rights over it exist ipso facto and can overlap between neighbours.
EEZ (exclusive economic zone): A zone up to 200 nautical miles (370 km) where the coastal state has resource rights.
Equity principle: The idea that delimitation should reach an equitable result, adjusting for disproportions in coastal length and the effect of small islands.
TRNC: The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, proclaimed on 15 November 1983; recognized only by Türkiye.
Treaty of Guarantee (1960): Treaty giving Türkiye, Greece and the United Kingdom guarantor status over Cyprus.

The Longpeace presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Role' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

Frequently asked questions

What exactly did Erdoğan propose in 2020?

He called for an inclusive Eastern Mediterranean conference bringing together all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots to discuss maritime jurisdiction and energy cooperation. Türkiye presents it as an alternative to competing unilateral agreements and drilling. The call has been repeated by Turkish officials since.

How is the conference proposal linked to the TRNC proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019?

The TRNC proposals offered joint decision-making and revenue sharing between the two communities on Cyprus over offshore hydrocarbons. Ankara sees the conference as the regional counterpart of those offers. Both rest on the argument that Turkish Cypriots hold equal rights as co-founders of the 1960 partnership.

Why have Greece, the Greek Cypriot administration and the EU not accepted it?

They generally prefer bilateral talks or the ICJ for delimitation and do not accept the TRNC participating as a separate party. The EU also considers the 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum to infringe third-state rights. Their position is that Cyprus's maritime rights are exercised by the Republic of Cyprus, with Turkish Cypriot interests addressed in a settlement.

What legal arguments does Türkiye rely on?

Türkiye relies on the equity principle in delimitation, customary international law (it is not a party to UNCLOS), and its 870 km coastline, the longest in the Eastern Mediterranean. It also points to its 2004 coordinates, the 2011 TRNC agreement, the 2019 Libya memorandum, the 2020 UN registration and the 2025 IOC-UNESCO record.

Can exploratory talks and a conference coexist?

Yes, in principle. The Türkiye–Greece exploratory talks resumed in 2021 and have been a channel for lowering tension, and a wider conference could sit alongside them. The unresolved questions are the Turkish Cypriot seat and a shared agenda.

Cross-Publication Perspectives & Cited Research

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4 Partner Desks