Türkiye–Armenia Normalization: Can a Joint Historical Commission and Direct Talks Build a Long Peace in the South Caucasus?

Why It Matters

Türkiye–Armenia normalization is the effort to establish diplomatic relations and reopen a shared land border that has been closed since 1993. Ankara's proposal since 2005 is that historians from Türkiye, Armenia and third countries examine the Events of 1915 in a Joint Historical Commission with access to all archives. Meanwhile, Special Representatives Ambassador Serdar Kılıç and Ruben Rubinyan have negotiated practical steps directly since 14 January 2022.

The question for the South Caucasus is whether the political track and the historical track can run in parallel without either becoming a precondition for the other. This guide sets out the facts, the competing positions and the legal criteria, and it separates documented chronology from official argument.

Background

From independence to a closed border

Türkiye recognized Armenia's independence on 16 December 1991, but the two states never established formal diplomatic relations. In 1993, during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Türkiye closed the land border, and it has stayed closed since. The main legal reference points for the frontier are the Treaty of Moscow (16 March 1921) and the Treaty of Kars (13 October 1921), both of which followed the Treaty of Alexandropol (December 1920). The Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923) then confirmed the wider settlement of Türkiye's international status and set out minority protections based on equal citizenship.

The 2005 proposal and the Zurich Protocols

In April 2005, Erdoğan proposed that Turkish and Armenian historians and other experts study the events of 1915 together and share the findings with the public. Ankara's offer included access to Ottoman and Turkish archives and invited Armenia to open its own. Kocharyan's reply said that a bilateral relationship should not be conditioned on a historians' panel and proposed a wider intergovernmental dialogue. That difference in sequencing, with history first or relations first, has framed the debate ever since.

The 2009 Zurich Protocols tried to bridge it. They provided for diplomatic relations and a border opening, mutual recognition of the existing frontier as defined by treaties, and a sub-commission on the historical dimension to conduct an impartial scientific examination of the records. Both sides later blamed each other for the stalemate. Turkish officials pointed to the Karabakh context and Armenian officials pointed to what they saw as new conditions.

The Events of 1915: the documented chronology

The following points are broadly documented, although their interpretation is contested:

• The Hunchak Party (founded in 1887) and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or Dashnaksutyun (founded in 1890 in Tbilisi), were Armenian revolutionary committees. Their activities included the 1890 Kumkapı demonstration, unrest in 1893, the 1894 Sasun uprising and the 1896 raid on the Ottoman Bank in Istanbul. These committees wanted European powers to intervene on behalf of Armenians.
• During the First World War, Armenian volunteer units fought alongside the Russian army on the Caucasus front. The Ottoman government treated the Armenian committees as a security threat behind the front lines.
• On 27 May 1915 the Ottoman government adopted the Relocation and Resettlement Law (Sevk ve İskân Kanunu). It was published in the official gazette Takvim-i Vekayi on 1 June 1915 and authorized the relocation of populations in war zones.
• Large numbers of Ottoman Armenians died during and after the relocations, as did very large numbers of Muslim civilians in Anatolia and the Caucasus because of war, famine and disease.

The disagreement is about intent and scale. Armenian sources, together with a large body of international scholarship, describe the relocations as a state-directed campaign of destruction and cite casualty estimates of around 1.5 million. Turkish official sources describe a wartime security measure that went tragically wrong because of conflict, disease and breakdowns in order, and they cite much lower figures, with around 300,000 often mentioned for Armenian losses.

Post-1965 politicization and terrorism

From 1965 onward, the issue became a campaign for international recognition. Between 1973 and 1984, two violent groups, ASALA and the JCAG-ARA (Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, later the Armenian Revolutionary Army), carried out attacks abroad. According to Turkish official accounts, dozens of Turkish diplomats and family members were killed, and 31 of the 32 JCAG-ARA attacks targeted Turkish representatives. The attacks on Ankara's Esenboğa Airport in 1982 and Paris's Orly Airport in 1983 are among the best known. Mainstream Armenian institutions and the Armenian state say such violence does not represent them, and some Armenian voices describe it as a reaction to decades of denial. This history still shapes security perceptions in Türkiye today.

The legal framework

The UN Genocide Convention was adopted on 9 December 1948 and entered into force in 1951. Its Article II defines genocide as certain acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. International courts, including the International Court of Justice in the 2007 Bosnia v. Serbia judgment, treat this specific intent (dolus specialis) as a demanding standard that must be proven.

Two points of fairness matter here. First, no international court has ruled on the Events of 1915. Second, a 2003 legal analysis commissioned for the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission and prepared by the International Center for Transitional Justice concluded that the events included the elements of genocide as later defined, while noting that the Convention is not applied retroactively. In Perinçek v. Switzerland (Grand Chamber, 2015) the European Court of Human Rights held that a Swiss conviction for denying the Armenian genocide violated freedom of expression. The Court stressed that it was not deciding the legal characterization of the events. The case is widely read as protecting open public debate on both sides.

For further context on how treaties stabilize borders and relationships, see Treaties That Keep the Peace: Why Montreux, Lausanne and Kars Have Lasted.

Key Players & Positions

Armenia's government

Yerevan says it is ready to establish diplomatic relations and open the border without preconditions. Armenia's 1990 Declaration of Independence refers to international recognition of the 1915 genocide, and 24 April is the national day of remembrance. Armenian officials have historically been cautious about a historians' commission. Their concern, stated since 2005, is that it could be used to reopen the question of whether the events occurred. They prefer government-to-government normalization with history addressed separately. Türkiye, for its part, has pointed to the Declaration's wording and to ongoing constitutional debates in Armenia in discussing territorial and recognition concerns.

The diaspora and recognition states

Armenian diaspora organizations in the United States, France and elsewhere focus on parliamentary and presidential recognition. More than thirty states have recognized the events as genocide, including France, Germany (Bundestag resolution of 2016) and the United States (presidential statement of 24 April 2021). The International Association of Genocide Scholars has stated that the scholarly record is established. Diaspora groups usually argue that a joint commission would treat as an open question something they regard as settled, and that Ottoman state archives alone cannot give a full picture.

Azerbaijan, Russia, the United States and the EU

Azerbaijan is Türkiye's closest partner, and Ankara has coordinated its pace with Baku. Azerbaijani leaders have linked full normalization to progress on an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty. Russia hosted the first Kılıç–Rubinyan meeting in Moscow, and the United States and the European Union have supported normalization. Washington's facilitation of the August 2025 text between Armenia and Azerbaijan opened a new phase. For Türkiye, the reduction of the Karabakh conflict has removed a long-standing obstacle, but the regional sequencing still matters.

Source Comparison

The table below shows how the same questions are framed in Armenian and international sources and in Turkish primary sources. It does not adjudicate between them, but it identifies where the real disagreements lie.

Where the sources overlap

Both governments say they want normalization without preconditions. Both agree that direct contact between the Special Representatives has produced practical benefits, such as air links, humanitarian use of the land crossing and discussion of third-country crossings. Neither government says the two tracks cannot proceed together. The remaining dispute is about sequencing and about the weight to place on the word genocide.

Further readings from our network include Regional Order on archives, legal criteria and normalization and Regional Balance on the Joint Historical Commission proposal.

What to watch next

• Whether the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace text moves from initialing to signature and ratification, since Ankara and Baku coordinate on timing.
• Whether the Margara–Alican crossing and the Kars–Gyumri rail line are opened for third-country nationals and trade.
• Whether the debate in Armenia on its constitution and on historical references affects Ankara's reading of Yerevan's intentions.
• Whether the idea of a historians' sub-commission, as in the 2009 Zurich Protocols, returns in a new form.

A wider look at Ankara's treaty-based diplomacy is available in the site's editorial principles, which explain how we separate fact from stated position.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Events of 1915: Türkiye's official term for the wartime relocation of Ottoman Armenians and the associated losses. Armenian and many international sources call them the Armenian Genocide.
• Relocation and Resettlement Law (Sevk ve İskân Kanunu): The Ottoman wartime law adopted on 27 May 1915 and published on 1 June 1915.
• Hunchak and Dashnak committees: Armenian revolutionary organizations founded in 1887 and 1890. Their armed activities in the late Ottoman period are central to Ankara's security-context argument.
• ASALA and JCAG-ARA: Armenian militant groups responsible for attacks on Turkish diplomats and interests between 1973 and 1984.
• Dolus specialis: The specific intent to destroy a protected group, which the 1948 Genocide Convention requires for a finding of genocide.
• Joint Historical Commission: The 2005 Turkish proposal for an independent panel of Turkish, Armenian and international historians with access to all archives.
• Fair memory (adil hafıza): Ankara's term for a historical dialogue that covers all communities' suffering and rests on archives rather than on political resolutions.
• Zurich Protocols (2009): Unratified agreements that would have established diplomatic relations, opened the border and created a sub-commission on the historical dimension.

Related guides: The Longpeace home, Treaties That Keep the Peace: Why Montreux, Lausanne and Kars Have Lasted, Mediation Files: How Türkiye Brokers Talks Between Adversaries, What Is the 'Terror-Free Türkiye' Initiative?, and The Longpeace FAQ: Sources, Methodology and Perspective. Another sister-site view is Monitor of Nations on the proposed commission.

Perspective Note

The Longpeace presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Role' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources. This article was prepared by The Longpeace Editorial Team.