Fact Check: Can Türkiye Be a Credible Mediator in the Russia–Ukraine War, or Is It Taking Sides?

Why It Matters

The claim: Türkiye's trade, energy and diplomatic ties with Moscow disqualify it as a mediator in the Russia–Ukraine war, or it quietly favours one side. The verdict: mostly misleading. Türkiye is not formally neutral and does not describe itself that way, but the documented record shows a consistent, treaty-based and even-handed handling of the war. Its role is that of a facilitator with access to both capitals, not of an impartial bystander.

The question matters because mediators are judged by process, not by the absence of relationships. If every state with commercial links to a belligerent were disqualified, few venues would remain for talks. This page tests the claim against primary records: the 1936 Montreux Convention, the Antalya and Istanbul meetings, the Black Sea Grain Initiative, prisoner exchanges, and statements by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Presidency. It also sets out the critics' strongest arguments.

Background

Türkiye shares the Black Sea with both Russia and Ukraine and controls the Bosporus and Dardanelles, the only exit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. It is a NATO member, a significant trading partner of Russia, and a supplier of defence equipment to Ukraine.

For a fuller account of the first round of negotiations, see What Happened at the 2022 Istanbul Talks Between Russia and Ukraine?.

Claim vs. Fact Analysis

Claim 1: 'Trade and energy ties with Moscow disqualify Türkiye as a mediator'

What is accurate: Türkiye did not join the sanctions regimes adopted by the EU, the United States and several other states. Russia is a major supplier of its natural gas through pipelines such as Blue Stream and TurkStream, and a Russian state company is building the Akkuyu nuclear power plant. Western officials have raised concerns about possible re-export of dual-use goods through third countries, including Türkiye.

What the record adds: These ties are not evidence of alignment on the war itself. Türkiye voted for the UN General Assembly resolution of 2 March 2022 demanding Russian withdrawal. According to the Turkish MFA, it does not recognise the 2014 annexation of Crimea or the 2022 annexations of Ukrainian regions and treats them as illegitimate. Mediation practice generally relies on a mediator that both parties can reach. Switzerland, Oman, Qatar and Norway have each mediated while keeping ties to at least one party. The fair criticism is that economic interdependence gives Moscow leverage over Ankara, not that it automatically invalidates every facilitation effort.

Claim 2: 'Türkiye quietly favours Russia and bends the rules for it'

The test is Montreux. Under the 1936 Montreux Convention, when Türkiye is not a belligerent, Article 19 bars warships of belligerent states from transiting the Straits. The Convention allows a narrow exception for ships returning to their home bases. Ankara announced in late February 2022 that it would apply this regime, and Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said Türkiye had asked all states, riparian or not, to refrain from sending warships through.

The effect was to close the Straits to Russian warships coming from outside the Black Sea as well as to any other belligerent's vessels. Critics argue that the returning-ships exception was exploited by Russia. Ankara responds that the exception is written into the treaty and that applying it selectively would breach the very text that makes the closure lawful. For the mechanics, see The Montreux Convention in Wartime: How Does the Turkish Straits Regime Actually Work? and Treaties That Keep the Peace: Why Montreux, Lausanne and Kars Have Lasted.

Claim 3: 'Türkiye is really on Ukraine's side'

The opposite accusation also circulates, mainly in Russian commentary. It points to Ukraine's purchases of Bayraktar TB2 drones from Türkiye's Baykar, to Ankara's refusal to recognise Crimea's annexation, and to the 2022 exchange in which five Azov commanders were transferred to Türkiye on condition that they stay there until the war ended. In July 2023 President Zelensky took the commanders back to Ukraine after meeting Erdoğan. Russian officials said this contradicted the arrangement, while Ukrainian officials said it was consistent with the support Ankara had expressed.

The documented facts are that Türkiye sells arms to Ukraine under commercial and state contracts, as it sells to many states, and that it has not joined sanctions on Russia. Both sets of facts coexist in the record. A state under pressure from both belligerents at once is behaving in a way that fits a balancing policy better than covert partisanship.

Claim 4: 'Türkiye's mediation has failed, so it is not credible'

This is the strongest critique. The Istanbul talks of March 2022 did not produce a ceasefire. The Black Sea Grain Initiative ended in July 2023 after Russia declined to extend it, citing the implementation of its separate memorandum with the UN on Russian food and fertilizer exports. The 2025 Istanbul rounds produced exchanges of prisoners and bodies, but no settlement.

The documented outcomes, however, are concrete:

• The grain agreement, signed by all four parties, helped move roughly 33 million tonnes of grain and oilseeds from Ukrainian ports through a corridor monitored by a Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul, easing pressure on global food markets. Three extensions were agreed before it lapsed.
• Prisoner exchanges and body repatriations, including the large exchange agreed in Istanbul in May 2025, have returned people to their families.
• The Antalya meeting of March 2022 and the Istanbul rounds provided the only venues where Russian and Ukrainian delegations sat in the same room during major phases of the war.

The fair reading is that Türkiye has delivered humanitarian and technical results more reliably than a political settlement, which depends chiefly on the belligerents. A related sister analysis examines whether Ankara obstructed the grain deal: Frontline Diplomacy: Fact Check: Did Türkiye Take Sides in the Black Sea Grain Initiative, or Did It Broker a Deal Both Russia and Ukraine Signed?.

Verdict

Source Comparison

Sister publications offer further context: The Political Anatomy: Türkiye as Mediator: Russia–Ukraine Talks, the Black Sea Grain Initiative and Gaza Humanitarian Diplomacy and The Global Anatomy: The Montreux Convention, the Black Sea and Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War. Readers should compare these with the treaty text and the signed grain documents. Our approach is described in Editorial Principles: Sources, Fact–Position Separation and Corrections.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Montreux Convention (1936): The treaty governing passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles; Article 19 restricts belligerent warships when Türkiye is not at war. See The Montreux Convention in Wartime and the sister analysis Regional Balance: The Montreux Convention, the Black Sea and Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War.
• Black Sea Grain Initiative: The July 2022 arrangement for the safe export of Ukrainian grain, monitored from Istanbul.
• Mediation vs. neutrality: A mediator facilitates talks and need not be equidistant; neutrality is a legal status with specific obligations that a NATO member does not hold.
• Belligerent: A state engaged in an armed conflict; Türkiye is not one in this war.

For wider context, see The Longpeace: Mediation, Treaties and Crisis Diplomacy From Türkiye's Perspective, the FAQ on sources and methodology and About The Longpeace.

The Longpeace presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.