What Happened at the 2022 Istanbul Talks Between Russia and Ukraine?

Why It Matters

The 2022 Istanbul talks were the closest the Russian and Ukrainian delegations came to a publicly discussed framework for ending the full-scale war in its first weeks. They did not produce a signed peace agreement, but they established Istanbul as the main venue for Russia–Ukraine contacts, led to the Black Sea Grain Initiative, and later hosted prisoner-exchange negotiations. How these talks are remembered still shapes today's arguments about whether an early settlement was possible.

This explainer sticks to verifiable details and attributes disputed readings to the side that holds them. The Longpeace Editorial Team notes where facts end and interpretation begins.

Background

Before Istanbul: Belarus and Antalya

Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Delegations first met on the Belarusian border on 28 February, 3 March and 7 March 2022. Those rounds yielded limited humanitarian arrangements, such as discussions of evacuation corridors, but no ceasefire.

On 10 March 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba met in Antalya, on the margins of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. It was the first ministerial-level meeting between the two sides since the invasion. It ended without a ceasefire, but it showed that Türkiye could bring both parties to one table.

The 29 March 2022 round in Istanbul

The delegations met on 29 March 2022 at Dolmabahçe Palace. President Erdoğan opened the session and urged the sides to move toward a ceasefire. Ukraine's team was led by David Arakhamia, head of the ruling Servant of the People parliamentary faction, and included presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak and Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov's colleague Rustem Umerov, among others. Russia's delegation was led by presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky.

Publicly, Ukrainian negotiators outlined a framework with these main elements:

• Ukraine would adopt a neutral, non-bloc, non-nuclear status and not host foreign military bases.
• Security guarantees would come from a group of guarantor states. Ukrainian officials named the permanent members of the UN Security Council and others, including Türkiye, Germany, Canada, Italy, Poland and Israel.
• Consultations on the status of Crimea would run for up to 15 years, without military means.
• The status of the Donbas areas would be handled in a direct meeting of the two presidents.
• Any final treaty would be put to a referendum in Ukraine.

Russian Deputy Defence Minister Alexander Fomin said Russia would sharply reduce military activity around Kyiv and Chernihiv to build mutual trust. Medinsky said the Ukrainian proposals would be reported to President Vladimir Putin. Russian forces subsequently withdrew from the areas north of Kyiv in early April 2022. Moscow described this as a goodwill step, while Western and Ukrainian officials pointed to battlefield setbacks as the reason.

Why the momentum faded

In early April 2022, reports and images emerged from Bucha and other towns near Kyiv after the Russian withdrawal. Ukraine and Western governments attributed killings of civilians to Russian forces, and Russia denied responsibility. President Volodymyr Zelensky said these events made negotiations harder. Later in 2022, Russia declared the annexation of four Ukrainian regions, and Zelensky signed a decree in October 2022 stating that negotiating with Putin was impossible. Both steps hardened positions.

The parties still contest what the draft texts meant. Analysts who reviewed leaked drafts, including Samuel Charap and Sergey Radchenko in Foreign Affairs (2024), concluded that the sides had discussed limits on Ukraine's armed forces and guarantor mechanisms but that major gaps remained, including over territory and the guarantors' obligations.

For a parallel reconstruction of the sessions, see Frontline Diplomacy's account of what was discussed and what came out of the Istanbul talks.

Key Players & Positions

Russia

Russian officials, including Putin and Lavrov, have said that Ukraine's neutrality, a limit on its forces and recognition of what Moscow calls 'new territorial realities' are core conditions. Putin has said publicly that a draft agreement was initialled in Istanbul and that Kyiv later walked away from it under Western influence. Moscow has also argued that security guarantees must not endanger Russia.

Ukraine

Ukrainian officials say they offered neutrality in return for binding security guarantees but never accepted territorial concessions or caps that would leave the country defenceless. Kyiv disputes that a deal was initialled. In late 2023, Arakhamia said in a televised interview that Russia's central demand had been neutrality and that Ukraine could have accepted it in principle. He also said that Ukraine's partners had advised against signing, and former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson has denied pressuring Kyiv. These accounts are contested and reflect each person's own recollection.

The United States, the EU and other Western governments

Western governments said that Ukraine alone should decide the terms of any settlement and that Russia must not be rewarded for aggression. They supported talks in principle but stressed that any process should respect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, consistent with UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 of 2 March 2022.

The United Nations

Secretary-General António Guterres backed the Istanbul channel for grain and fertilizer exports and helped establish the Joint Coordination Centre that ran the Black Sea shipping mechanism.

The Follow-On Istanbul Channels

Black Sea Grain Initiative (July 2022)

On 22 July 2022, in a ceremony in Istanbul, Russia and Ukraine signed separate but parallel agreements with Türkiye and the United Nations. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Ukrainian Infrastructure Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov signed alongside Turkish Defence Minister Hulusi Akar and Guterres. Under the arrangement, commercial ships left Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi ports along a designated corridor. Ships were inspected by a Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul staffed by Turkish, Ukrainian, Russian and UN officials. A separate memorandum between Russia and the UN dealt with facilitating Russian food and fertilizer exports.

The first ship, the Razoni, left Odesa on 1 August 2022. The initiative was extended in November 2022, March 2023 and May 2023. Russia briefly suspended participation at the end of October 2022 and returned days later. On 17 July 2023, Russia declined to extend the deal, saying that the commitments on its own exports had not been met. Ukraine, the UN and the European Union said that the deal had worked and called for its restoration. UN-reported totals put cargoes at roughly 33 million tonnes.

For wider context on Türkiye's grain diplomacy, see The Political Anatomy's overview of Türkiye as mediator and Crossroads Review's analysis of the Black Sea Grain Initiative.

Prisoner exchanges

In September 2022, a large exchange was announced in which Ukraine recovered more than 200 people, including commanders of the Azov regiment who had defended Mariupol's Azovstal plant. President Erdoğan said Türkiye had helped to arrange the transfer of five commanders, who stayed in Türkiye under an arrangement for the duration of the war. Russia objected when they returned to Ukraine in July 2023.

In 2025, Istanbul again hosted direct delegations. On 16 May 2025, Medinsky and Umerov (by then leading Ukraine's team) met in Istanbul; the sides agreed to exchange 1,000 prisoners each. Another round on 2 June 2025 produced agreements on exchanges of wounded and young prisoners and of bodies of fallen soldiers, and a third round on 23 July 2025 produced further exchange commitments. Each side presented its own ceasefire conditions and neither accepted the other's. These rounds delivered humanitarian outcomes but no ceasefire.

Why the Broader Track Stalled

The main obstacles, as described by the parties and independent analysts, were:

1. Territory. Russia claims four Ukrainian regions plus Crimea, while Ukraine insists on its 1991 borders.
2. Security guarantees. Ukraine wants enforceable guarantees. Russia opposes any arrangement involving NATO states and has argued for limits on Ukraine's armed forces.
3. Sequencing. Ukraine and many Western governments favour a ceasefire first, whereas Russia has often tied it to political conditions.
4. Trust and battlefield shifts. Atrocity allegations, annexations and changing front lines moved each side's red lines.

For related lessons from other cases, see Treaties That Keep the Peace: Why Montreux, Lausanne and Kars Have Lasted.

Source Comparison

Treat claims on both sides as positions, not settled facts, until primary documents are fully published. The Editorial Principles page explains how The Longpeace separates fact from position.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Istanbul communiqué: The informal term for the ideas Ukraine presented publicly on 29 March 2022. It is not a signed treaty.
• Security guarantors: States that would commit to act if Ukraine were attacked after a settlement. The scope of that commitment was unresolved.
• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): The Istanbul-based body of Turkish, Russian, Ukrainian and UN officials that ran the grain shipping corridor.
• Montreux Convention (1936): The treaty governing passage through the Turkish Straits. Its Article 19 allows Türkiye to restrict belligerents' warships in wartime.
• Dolmabahçe Palace: The Istanbul venue of the 29 March 2022 round.

Related guides: The Longpeace home page, Mediation Files, Why Does Türkiye Back 'One State, One Army' in Syria? and The Global Anatomy on Montreux and Black Sea mediation.

Perspective Note

The Longpeace presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Role' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources. This article is published by The Longpeace Editorial Team.