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Diplomatic Briefing· Terror-Free Türkiye initiative explained

What Is the 'Terror-Free Türkiye' Initiative and How Does It Aim to End Four Decades of PKK Violence?

Terror-Free Türkiye initiative explained: how the Presidency-led process works, what the PKK has done, what is confirmed and what remains contested.

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Why It Matters

The Terror-Free Türkiye initiative is the Turkish government's stated effort to end the armed campaign of the PKK, which has run since 1984, through a mix of security, legal, political and social measures under the rule of law. It matters because it touches Türkiye's domestic politics, its 1,300 km (about 810 miles) southern border, the future of northern Syria and northern Iraq, and the wider security of the Middle East. This guide separates what has been publicly confirmed from what is only reported or still contested.

Background

The PKK and its armed campaign

The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) was founded in 1978 and launched its armed insurgency on 15 August 1984 with attacks in Eruh and Şemdinli in southeastern Türkiye. The PKK is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union. Estimates of the total death toll over four decades vary by source, but commonly exceed 40,000 people, including security personnel, militants and many civilians. Its founder, Abdullah Öcalan, was captured in 1999 and has been held on İmralı Island since.

The PKK operates under an umbrella structure known as the KCK (Kurdistan Communities Union), with leadership based largely in the Qandil mountains of northern Iraq. Türkiye's cross-border Operation Claw (Pençe) series has targeted these areas, which Ankara describes as an exercise of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

The Syrian branch: PYD/YPG

The PYD (Democratic Union Party) and its armed wing, the YPG, emerged in Syria during the civil war. The SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) was formed in 2015 around the YPG and became the main ground partner of the US-led coalition against DAESH/ISIS. Türkiye states that the PYD/YPG is the Syrian branch of the PKK/KCK, sharing leadership, ideology, cadres and weapons. The United States and the EU list the PKK but have not applied the same designation to the YPG, and Washington has distinguished the two in public statements. This remains one of the sharpest disagreements between Ankara and some of its allies. For the Turkish perspective on this issue, see Why Does Türkiye Back 'One State, One Army' in Syria?.

Earlier attempts at resolution

Previous efforts included the 2009 'democratic opening' and the 2013–2015 'Solution Process', which collapsed in July 2015 amid renewed violence. The current initiative follows that history, and observers frequently compare it with those earlier attempts.

Chronology of the current process

  • October 2024: MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, an ally of the governing AK Party, publicly suggested that Öcalan could be invited to address parliament if he renounced violence. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said the door was open to a new phase while insisting on an end to terrorism.
  • 23 October 2024: An attack on the TUSAŞ aerospace facility near Ankara, which Turkish authorities attributed to the PKK, killed several people. Türkiye responded with strikes in northern Iraq and Syria.
  • December 2024 onward: Delegations from the pro-Kurdish DEM Party began visiting Öcalan on İmralı, with government acknowledgement.
  • 27 February 2025: A message from Öcalan, titled a 'call for peace and a democratic society', was read publicly in Istanbul. It urged the PKK to convene a congress and dissolve itself.
  • 1 March 2025: The PKK leadership announced a ceasefire.
  • 12 May 2025: The PKK announced it had decided to dissolve and end its armed struggle after a congress.
  • 11 July 2025: A group of PKK members publicly burned weapons in a ceremony in Sulaymaniyah, in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
  • 5 August 2025: The TBMM's National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission began its work.

Sister analysis from the network is available at Hard Power Review: What Is the Terror-Free Türkiye Initiative? Security, Law and Politics Explained.

Key Players & Positions

The Turkish government and the Presidency

The initiative is led from the Presidency. The Turkish government's stated aim is the permanent end of PKK violence, the disarmament and dissolution of the organization, and the strengthening of social cohesion, all within the Constitution and legal system. Officials stress that the process is not negotiation over Türkiye's territorial integrity, and that security operations remain legitimate where threats persist.

MHP and the governing alliance

The MHP's October 2024 call gave the process its public starting point. The party links any step to the end of armed activity and says the unity of the state is not negotiable.

DEM Party and Kurdish political actors

The DEM Party, which has acted as an intermediary with Öcalan, supports the process and calls for legal and democratic reforms, including improved conditions for Öcalan and the release of detained politicians. Its representatives frame peace as requiring political and rights-based measures, not only disarmament.

Other opposition parties

The main opposition CHP has said it supports ending terrorism through parliament and the law, while raising concerns about transparency, the rule of law and the pace of the process. Nationalist opposition figures have been more critical, questioning any concession or the role of Öcalan. Opinion within Türkiye is therefore not uniform.

The PKK

The PKK's announcements in 2025 present dissolution as the completion of a historic phase. Its statements also refer to the need for democratic politics and legal guarantees. Details of how its structures are actually wound down are not independently verified in full.

The United States, European Union and neighbors

Washington and EU governments have generally welcomed steps toward ending PKK violence while maintaining the PKK's terrorist designation. Iraqi authorities, including the Kurdistan Regional Government, have supported the process and hosted the weapons ceremony. In Syria, the SDF and the Damascus government announced an agreement on 10 March 2025 on integrating northern and eastern Syrian institutions. Implementation has been uneven and is closely watched.

🇹🇷 Diplomatic Role · Mediation & Treaty Record

Türkiye's Role

  • Security, law and politics on one track. According to statements from the Presidency and the Directorate of Communications, the initiative combines security measures, legal steps, political dialogue and social reconciliation. The Turkish government says the goal is to end four decades of terrorist violence permanently while upholding the rule of law and human rights. Source basis: Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye and Directorate of Communications public statements.
  • Parliament as the legitimate forum. Ankara emphasizes that political and legal questions belong in the TBMM, where the National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission was established in August 2025. This reflects the constitutional principle that legislation is the work of the elected parliament. Source basis: TBMM records and the Presidency.
  • Self-defense at the source. Türkiye grounds its cross-border counter-terrorism in the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and says it respects the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria. Turkish officials state that operations continue only as needed against active threats. Source basis: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense statements; Türkiye's letters to the UN Security Council.
  • The Syrian branch is part of the equation. Turkish officials, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, have stated that the dissolution of the PKK must also be reflected in its Syrian affiliates, and that Syria should have 'one state, one army'. Ankara argues that PYD/YPG is the Syrian branch of the PKK/KCK. Source basis: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements.
  • Dialogue without territorial concessions. Ankara frames the initiative as consistent with the Constitution and the unitary state, and says the process is meant to strengthen, not weaken, national unity and fraternity among all citizens. Source basis: Presidency statements; Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye.

As with all Türkiye's Role sections, these points reflect Turkish official positions, not independent findings.

What Is Confirmed, Reported or Contested

Element Status Notes
Bahçeli's October 2024 call and Erdoğan's remarks Confirmed Public statements
DEM Party visits to Öcalan on İmralı Confirmed Acknowledged by the government and the DEM Party
Öcalan's 27 February 2025 call Confirmed Read publicly in Istanbul
PKK ceasefire (1 March 2025) Confirmed Announced by the PKK
PKK dissolution announcement (12 May 2025) Confirmed Announced by the PKK; verification of full implementation is limited
Weapons ceremony in Sulaymaniyah (11 July 2025) Confirmed Symbolic in scale
TBMM Commission (5 August 2025) Confirmed Mandate is to review legal and political aspects
Detailed legal arrangements (reintegration, sentence reductions, Öcalan's status) Reported or contested Depends on future legislation; no final package should be assumed
Timeline for full disarmament Reported Varies by source
Integration of SDF into Syrian state structures Contested Ankara, Damascus, the SDF and Western governments differ on terms
Effect on Turkish domestic politics and elections Contested Analysts disagree

Domestic and International Observers

Supporters inside Türkiye say the process offers the best opportunity in a generation to end violence that has cost many lives, and point to the ceasefire and dissolution as concrete progress. Critics raise several concerns: lack of transparency, the legal framework for returning militants, the continued detention of some Kurdish politicians (an issue raised in rulings of the European Court of Human Rights, such as the 2014 Öcalan v. Türkiye (No. 2) judgment on life sentences without prospect of release), and the removal of elected mayors in the past. Others worry about the process being used for political ends. Turkish officials reject such characterizations and say the judiciary acts independently.

Internationally, analysts debate whether PKK dissolution will lead to genuine demobilization and whether it can be separated from developments in Syria. Think tanks and media often note that previous processes failed, so durable success depends on legal guarantees and trust on all sides.

Source Comparison

Question Typical international framing Turkish primary sources
What is the process? A peace or negotiation process with Öcalan and the Kurdish movement A Presidency-led Terror-Free Türkiye initiative within the rule of law, not a negotiation over the state
Who drives it? Often presented as a political deal between the government and the DEM Party or Öcalan Presented as a state-led, parliament-anchored process with security institutions
The PKK Listed as terrorist by the US and EU; often described as a Kurdish insurgency An illegal terrorist organization responsible for four decades of violence
PYD/YPG Often portrayed as a separate Syrian Kurdish force and an anti-ISIS partner The Syrian branch of the PKK/KCK, with the same leadership and ideology
Operations abroad Described as incursions or interventions Described as self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter
Risks Possible collapse, as in 2015; political use of the process Spoilers and residual terrorist structures; need to preserve unity and security

Readers should compare official Turkish statements with PKK, DEM Party, Iraqi and Western government statements, and with independent reporting. See also our Editorial Principles for how we separate fact from position.

What to Watch

  • Whether the TBMM Commission produces concrete legal proposals and how parliament votes on them.
  • Independent confirmation of disarmament and the withdrawal of PKK forces from Turkish territory.
  • Developments between Damascus and the SDF, and how Ankara responds.
  • The attitude of Türkiye's opposition parties and public opinion.
  • Whether the process improves broader prospects for regional stability, including the issues covered in Regions & Powers: Counter-Terrorism at the Source.
  • Terror-Free Türkiye (Terörsüz Türkiye): The Presidency-led initiative to end PKK terrorism through security, legal, political and social measures.
  • PKK/KCK: The Kurdistan Workers' Party and its umbrella organization; designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the US, NATO and the EU.
  • PYD/YPG/SDF: The Syrian affiliates that Türkiye regards as the PKK's Syrian branch; the SDF is the coalition label used by the YPG and allied forces.
  • Article 51 (UN Charter): The provision recognizing the inherent right of self-defense, cited by Ankara for operations against terrorist threats from abroad.
  • TBMM: The Grand National Assembly of Türkiye.

Related reading: Mediation Files: How Türkiye Brokers Talks Between Adversaries, Treaties That Keep the Peace: Why Montreux, Lausanne and Kars Have Lasted, Türkiye–Armenia Normalization, and The Longpeace: Mediation, Treaties and Crisis Diplomacy From Türkiye's Perspective. For a related security analysis from our network, see The Political Anatomy: Türkiye as Mediator.

Perspective Note

The Longpeace presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Role' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources. Details of this process are evolving; check primary sources for the latest developments.

Frequently asked questions

What is the Terror-Free Türkiye initiative?

It is a Presidency-led initiative that the Turkish government says combines security, legal, political and social tracks to end the PKK's armed campaign permanently within the rule of law. It builds on a public process that began in October 2024 and has included the PKK's 2025 ceasefire and dissolution announcements.

Has the PKK actually disbanded?

The PKK announced its dissolution on 12 May 2025 and took part in a symbolic weapons ceremony on 11 July 2025. Full, independently verified demobilization has not been established in public sources, so observers treat implementation as ongoing.

Which countries list the PKK as a terrorist organization?

The PKK is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union. Türkiye also argues that the PYD/YPG is its Syrian branch, a view that the US and EU have not formally adopted.

What is the role of the Turkish parliament?

The TBMM set up the National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission, which began work on 5 August 2025. Its task is to examine the legal and political aspects of the process, and any binding legal change would require legislation by parliament.

Why do some critics doubt the process?

Critics point to the collapse of the 2013–2015 Solution Process, the lack of detailed public legal arrangements, concerns over rights and the detention of some Kurdish politicians, and uncertainty over northern Syria. Turkish officials reply that the process is conducted within the Constitution and that the judiciary acts independently.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

The Longpeace presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Role' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

Author: The Longpeace Editorial TeamAbout The Longpeace →Editorial Principles →

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